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“There’s no such thing as neutral education. Education either functions as an instrument to bring
about conformity or freedom.” (Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 1968).

Abstract
During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Russia focused on spreading
their distinctive ideologies across the globe, and in doing so, came in direct competition
with one another. In this study, I employ content analysis of two major U.S. and Soviet
education reports and reforms from 1983 to 1991, namely A Nation at Risk and
Fundamental Directions of General and Vocational School Reform, to explore and
illustrate how the two states wielded their youth as weapons in a battle for ideological
supremacy. My findings add nuance to the conversation surrounding education as a
method of state control.
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Introduction
Nineteen eighty-three was a tumultuous year for the United States and Soviet
Russia, marking a turning point in both their domestic affairs and international relations.
In April, the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) published a
report titled A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform, which painted a
grim picture of American schooling and warned that the fabric of American democracy
and security could unravel without major and immediate changes to the education
system. The commission cited evidence from low graduation rates and test scores to
illiteracy and poor international standing (The National Commission on Excellence in
Education 1983, 11). While the United States was seemingly facing a crisis of education,
Soviet Russia was struggling with major economic decline and insecurity in leadership.
In the span of three years, from 1982 to 1985, Soviet Russia underwent three leadership
changes, from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko to Gorbachev. The various General
Secretaries attempted to tackle the largest threats to the health of the union during their
terms—environmental pollution, a declining economy, worsening health and alcoholism,
and housing and food shortages (Hoffmann, 1984, 237). By the time Gorbachev rose to
power in 1985, he saw the only path forward as one of extensive governmental change,
implementing the fundamental reforms known as glasnost (openness) and perestroika
(reconstruction).
While the two states were facing major internal hardship, the Cold War added
another dimension to the struggle. In March of 1983, former President Reagan made a
famous speech at a convention for the National Association of Evangelicals where he
denounced the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” and described the conflict between the
Sahm 4

two states as a struggle “between right and wrong, good and evil” (Reagan, 1983). His
aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union renewed tensions that had lessened during the
period of détente in the 1970s, leading to increased paranoia among Soviet leaders
surrounding an imminent nuclear attack. In November of 1983, tensions reached what
some historians deem “the most dangerous moment in the history of the Cold War,”
when the Soviets suspected that the United States was plotting to launch a nuclear attack
(Shane 2003). The incident occurred when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) conducted its annual war game, Able Archer, which was a simulation of nuclear
conflict between the East and the West. The Soviets believed that NATO was planning to
initiate nuclear war under the guise of a war exercise, and in response to this intelligence,
almost launched a preemptive strike against the United States. Nuclear war was narrowly
avoided, but Able Archer marked the beginning of the final era of the two states’ bitter
fight for global control. Due to heightened tension and competition during this period, I
examine schooling as a front in the Cold War, specifically asking the question: Did the
U.S. and Soviet Russia weaponize their education systems in an effort to win the Cold
War? If so, how did this weaponization manifest? In the next section, I review the
literature on civil defense and ideology as educational tools of war during the 1950s and
1960s. Then, I introduce my methodology, present my analysis, and draw conclusions to
inform future research.
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Chapter 1: Analytical Approach
The Cold War was not fought through direct combat between the United States
and Soviet Russia, but rather, it became a war of ideas waged through espionage,
technological innovation, media, economic aid, proxy wars, military coalitions, arms
buildups, and of course, education (“The Cold War | JFK Library”, 2021). From reform
initiatives such as A Nation at Risk and perestroika to potential nuclear conflicts like
Able Archer, the 1980s represented a new phase of the Cold War that lasted until the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. This period is particularly interesting due to the
lack of critical scholarship on educational policies and practices as tools of competition,
especially in comparison to the attention paid to the subject during the space race in the
1950s and 1960s. However, looking back on this earlier time period can provide integral
context for understanding the actions and intentions of the two states as they
implemented later education reforms. In this section, I review the literature on the
multiple fronts of the Cold War, education as a battlefront, and methods of educational
weaponization, which motivates my hypotheses on later trends in Cold War education as
a tool of war.

The Educational Front
In his article, “Korea and the Cold War,” Steve Estes argues that the United States
and Soviet Russia fought the Cold War using espionage in “developed” countries and
proxy wars in “developing” countries. The Korean War in the 1950s was the first of these
proxy wars, where the United States joined capitalist South Korea in a war against
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communist North Korea in an effort to stop the spread of communism through Asia.
Kristie Macrakis adds another dimension to Estes’ argument in her article, “Technophilic
Hubris and Espionage Styles During the Cold War.” Macrakis analyzes the combination
of technology and espionage as a weapon of war, arguing that, while the United States
won the Cold War, the East Bloc won the spy wars. The East Bloc’s use of human spies
proved to be advantageous, whereas the United States relied too heavily on technical
means to learn about the communist state (Macrakis, 2010, 378). Because of their
superior strategy, Soviet spies were able to infiltrate every level of American society with
ease, including the CIA, science and technology sector, and the FBI. Though the two
states made many efforts to win the Cold War through these battles for intelligence and
military control, the educational battle had one of the largest direct impacts on the
American and Soviet populations. Through educational reforms such as the Soviet
Fundamental Directions of General and Vocational School Reform and the American
Reform Waves 1 and 2 that followed A Nation at Risk, the United States and Soviet
Russia weaponized their own people to bolster their economies, support their war
policies, and diligently prevent outside attacks.
In the context of the Cold War, where ideology was at the forefront of the
conflict, it was essential for the United States and Soviet Russia to foster national unity
through education. However, this is not unique to the Cold War example, as it is common
for nations to weaponize education to compete with each other. Such was the case in
China at the end of their civil war in 1949. In his article “Education as a Tool of Power:
An Analysis of the Schools of Red China Today,” Del Weber examines how education
was used by China’s communist regime following the Chinese Civil War. Weber argues
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that the Communist Party exerted control largely through the ministry of education,
which held conferences with educators, published policy directives, implemented unified
assignments and assessments, and provided the majority of school funding. In explaining
why the Communist Party of China focused so heavily on education, Weber quotes LuTing Yi, head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Communist
Party: “What people require education for is to wage the class struggle and the struggle
for production. We believe there are only two kinds of knowledge in the world. One kind
is the knowledge of the class struggle...the other kind of knowledge is the knowledge of
the struggle for production...and philosophy is the summing up and generalization of the
two kinds of knowledge” (Weber, 1960, 390). Yi describes the direct connection between
education and politics and argues that they are inextricably linked. Weber also references
Mao Zedong, the former President of the People’s Republic of China, who outlined a
plan for combining education and labor to dissolve the class distinction between those
who work and those who learn. Using these various tactics, leaders of the Communist
Party of China utilized education as a tool for unifying and mobilizing the republic
behind a common political cause. In this sense, education during wartime is a source of
ammunition, and becomes integral to maintaining state control.
Clifford W. Patton expands further on Weber’s assertions in “Civilian Wartime
Education in the Schools and Colleges,” focusing on American education during the final
years of World War II. Patton argues that the content taught in schools is passed on to
adults and helps shape the thoughts, feelings, and actions of entire communities. Because
education is such an influential component of daily life, it is utilized in wartime to create
a patriotic citizen with the ability to “acquire new economic concepts; to rethink his
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individual relationship to democracy; to redefine his concepts of freedom; to understand
new problems and new issues which develop as a result of conflict” (Patton, 1945, 285286). While there are other avenues for fighting wars—such as the military and
economy—these are not independent of the educational front. Instead, Patton argues that
“schools must chart the course of battle, and then help fight it” (Patton, 1945, 286). The
education system guides students down a carefully prepared path, aiding the war effort
and ensuring an economically prosperous future.

Civil Defense
One of the key ways the United States and Soviet Russia utilized education as a
weapon of war in an earlier era was through civil defense programs. In her article, “‘A Is
for Atom, B Is for Bomb’: Civil Defense in American Public Education, 1948-1963,”
JoAnne Brown argues that educators taught violent and mature civil defense concepts to
children by “domesticating the bomb,” essentially framing atomic war as an ordinary fact
of life and assimilating this idea into childrens’ daily routines. This domestication has
deeply impacted the psyche of America’s baby boomer generation, teaching youth to
“equate emotional maturity with an attitude of calm acceptance toward nuclear war,”
which effectively replaced normal human responses to mass death, such as fear and
horror, with tranquil patriotism (Brown, 1988, 90). Though Brown details the
psychological impact of civil defense education on children, she stops short of naming
the intent behind these programs.
Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman take Brown’s assertion a step further in their
study of American civil defense during the early years of the Cold War, “Managing
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Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American Civil Defense Strategy.” They argue that civil
defense was a government effort to control the public’s response to nuclear war. Oakes
and Grossman describe the civil defense establishment’s strategy for replacing the normal
human response to nuclear war with inhuman behavior that benefits the state’s war effort.
A panicked and terrified public was of no use to the government, so civil defense
planners implemented programs that “required the American public to exhibit credible
expressions of determination to fight a nuclear war,” which “included the design of a
system of emotion management that would suppress an uncontrollable and dangerous
terror of atomic weapons and foster in its stead a more benign and pliable nuclear fear,”
(Oakes & Grossman, 1992, 361). The intent behind emotion management strategies was
to create common consensus surrounding America’s role in the Cold War. The American
government knew that a lack of broad domestic support for their national security
strategy—which assured public safety through nuclear deterrence—meant their plan
would be undermined and they would be less effective in containing a Soviet threat.
Therefore, the true objective of civil defense programs was not to protect the American
people, but rather to legitimize the American Cold War strategy of nuclear deterrence.
Similarly to the United States, one of the main intents behind Soviet civil defense
was to maintain high public morale. In her article, “Seven Warning Signals: A Review of
Soviet Civil Defense,” Joanne Gailer agrees with Soviet strategist Vasily Sokolovsky,
that nuclear warfare could easily lead the general public to extreme panic. Gailer argues
that, to counteract this undesirable reaction, the Kremlin implemented two strategies: “(1)
they have created a service within the militia with the explicit purpose of preserving order
and morale and (2) they continue to instill patriotism into the population and also the
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readiness to bear hardships” (Gailer, 1969, 22). These strategies were achieved through
civil defense education, which the Soviets presented as an honorable way to become a
more upstanding citizen. To reinforce the importance of civil defense to children, the
Soviets emphasized what the children had learned at school in other areas of their lives.
For example, “in summer camps...pennants, citations, and buttons are awarded for
excellence in drills and exercises,” and “there is occasional television coverage of the
exercises so that the children can have the treat of seeing themselves on TV” (Gailer,
1969, 22). This portrayal of civil defense in Soviet society affirms what The Center for
Defense Information, a non-profit organization based in Washington D.C., argued was
the main intent behind the program. The organization asserts that Soviet civil defense was
not intended to deter and protect against nuclear war, but acted “to instill and maintain
garrison-state mentality and the belief that the leaders are protecting their people” (Geist,
2019, 226). While there was an absence of professional consensus around the
effectiveness of civil defense, it was clear that both the United States and Soviet Russia
used civil defense as an emotion management strategy and benefited from the results of
the program.

Political Ideology
The second crucial way the United States and Soviet Russia weaponized
education for an advantage in the Cold War was through mandated ideological curricula.
In his article, “Literature in the Soviet School as an Everyday Ideology,” Evgeny
Ponomarev expands on scholars’ descriptions of civil defense indoctrination by detailing
another form of state control in schools—the study of ideology through literature.
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Ponomarev argues that literature was the “principal ideological subject in Soviet
schools,” and constituted the main avenue for the political indoctrination of
schoolchildren (Ponomarev, 2018, 105). The Soviets implemented literature as an
academic discipline in the mid-1930s, and an increasing emphasis on this area of study
coincided with a shift in Soviet ideology from Lenin’s international revolutionary project
to Stalin’s national patriotism project.
Literature was chosen as the principal ideological subject because of its unique
ability to shape students’ views of the world. During lessons, students were often asked
what decisions they would make if they were certain characters, effectively situating
book characters within students’ moral landscapes and framing them as friends, enemies,
and heroes. This restructuring of reality is a concept Ponomarev refers to as naïve
realism, which allows the state to assert its agenda through literary study. Ponomarev
argues that Soviet schools saw the literary process as a “weapon of social struggle and the
revolutionary cause,” and by studying Russian literature, students were able to
understand the history of revolutionary ideas and then enter into the revolutionary
struggle themselves (Ponomarev, 2018, 108). By 1950, literary study had shifted away
from reading books altogether, and instead, educators taught excerpts of texts included in
textbooks and anthologies. They were expected to teach these literary excerpts with an
animated performance, igniting a revolutionary spark in their students. Literature became
more about emotional manipulation and less about intellectual development.
Similarly, U.S. educational efforts attempted to engage ideology for political gain.
Following the Sputnik launch in 1957, the U.S. was faced with an educational crisis.
While the government scrambled to improve math and science education and innovation,
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policymakers acknowledged the importance of implementing anti-communist material in
the curriculum. McCarthyism of the early 1950s had effectively eradicated the American
communist movement, and even slightly left-leaning educators had altered their
pedagogical approaches to avoid losing their jobs. The result was an educational shift to
the right, though conservatives and liberals alike were responsible for the assault on
leftist educators. Hartman (2008) argues that “the red scare assault on the Teachers Union
symbolized a broad, anti-civil liberties consensus that spanned the political spectrum”
(Hartman, 2008, 74). This attack on left-leaning pedagogy led to a severe lack of
ideological education in American social studies classrooms.
Educators shied away from speaking about communism altogether for fear of
scrutiny and punishment. But following Sputnik, American educational institutions
recognized a needed shift in educational strategy. By 1961, the American Legion
partnered with the National Education Association and the American Bar Association to
promote courses comparing Soviet and American political systems. Textbook companies
jumped at the chance to capitalize on a new market for anti-communist textbooks, and
Florida’s legislature mandated “Americanism versus Communism” (AVC) classes with
“a simplistic, binary approach, and little pretense of objectivity” (Scribner, 2012, 352).
Following Florida’s lead, five states implemented policies similar to AVC and thirty-four
other states mandated anti-communism education in social studies classes. Scribner
quotes various writers’ observations of these classes, noting that they found the classes to
present communism as “an intellectual, political, and moral challenge, so that students
might lose their complacency and become intellectually aroused, so that the answers they
reach will become and remain meaningful to them” (Scribner, 2012, 357). Though this
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ideological education attempted to engage students in discussion surrounding political
values, many students remained either uninterested or unconvinced by the curriculum.
Scribner notes that “students writing about their experiences in Florida's AVC classes
overwhelmingly dismissed them as propagandistic,” and the educational emphasis on
critical thinking and pluralism undermined the effectiveness of these curricular efforts
(Scribner, 2012, 360). While many scholars, including Scribner, Hartman, and Goodman,
have deemed these anti-communist educational policies as failures based on their lack of
success in appealing to students’ reason, they have still had a considerable impact on the
general American consensus surrounding political ideology. Similarly to Soviet
ideological education, the American curriculum appealed to the students’ emotions,
leaving them with a visceral disapproval of the Soviet Union, but an inability to articulate
why. In this sense, AVC and other ideological education succeeded in creating a general
opposition to the Soviet way of life.
Though various scholars have analyzed the importance of education as a tool for
implementing state values and ideology, they have not explicitly stated that education
was wielded as an instrument of war. Additionally, there is a lack of research surrounding
politicians’ articulation of this strategy, particularly during the final phase of the Cold
War, from 1983 to 1991. Education was clearly weaponized by both states to win the
Cold War, but in what ways was ideology transmitted? And how did educational methods
shift during this later period of education reform? In this study, I will analyze prominent
reports and policies from this era to gauge the way the U.S. and Soviet Russia used
education as a war tactic. Through analysis of these key texts, I shed light on education as
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a war strategy, illuminating the process through which American and Soviet youth
became pawns in a battle of ideology.

Hypotheses & Methodology
Based on the literature, it is clear that the United States and Soviet Russia
implemented similar educational tactics to mobilize their schooling systems as weapons
of state control. However, the United States began with civil defense in the 1950s and
taught very little about communism in schools. The shift to explicit ideological
curriculum did not occur until the 1960s. In contrast, Soviet Russia’s education system
was founded in the 1920s on a strong ideological curriculum, and once the Cold War
began, this educational strategy remained intact with only minor reforms.
Due to the scholarly agreement that the educational tactics of civil defense and
ideology were weaponized as methods of state control, I develop three main hypotheses:
1. The United States and Soviet Russia used education as a weapon of war during
the final phase of the Cold War, 1983 to 1991.
2. Because popular belief in the efficacy of civil defense had declined in both states
by the 1980s, civil defense played a less significant role during this time period.
Any remaining civil defense education was implemented as a method of state
control and not a method of homeland defense.
3. The utilization of ideology as a weapon of state control adopted stronger emphasis
on economic values throughout this time period given the urgent need of both
states to demonstrate economic dominance and create a stronger school-to-labor
force pipeline.
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To test these hypotheses, I employ content analysis of two key documents, the
American report A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform, and the
Soviet policy Fundamental Directions of General and Vocational School Reform. I
identify key themes from the documents by searching for the inclusion of specific
categories: expression of the author’s intentions, connection between state educational
agendas and other societal sectors, international references and comparisons, and mention
of political ideology and educational theory. Rather than impose strict guidelines for my
analysis, I allow patterns and themes to emerge within these broader categories. After
identifying the main themes for each document, I explore how the rhetorical strategies in
key passages point to the weaponization of education to help fight the Cold War.
Given that rhetorical analysis requires the evaluation of specific vocabulary, the
English-Russian language barrier is a limitation of this study. The Soviet policy
document was originally written in Russian and translated into English, making the
interpretation of tone and connotation even more subjective. Additionally, the number of
case studies is limited by time constraints for this research project, making it more
difficult to paint a picture of the larger time period from 1983 to 1991. I chose the
documents in this study for their prominence and impact in the educational sphere, but
including more policy documents as well as political speeches would certainly make this
project more comprehensive. Despite these limitations, my analysis of A Nation at Risk
and Fundamental Directions of General Education and Vocational School Reform is
thorough and detailed, and when placed into context, speaks to the larger educational
direction of the time period.
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Chapter 2: A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform
My analysis begins with the 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk due to its
formative influence on the way policymakers and the American public viewed schooling
in the 1980s and beyond. The report warned of the erosion of the educational foundations
of American society due to a “rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a
Nation and a people” (The National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983, 9).
Though Soviet Russia was never explicitly mentioned, several themes present throughout
the report allude to the Cold War context, and more generally, highlight the motivation
behind the report’s alarming message. The main themes include inflammatory war
terminology, international comparison, ideological justification, and economic incentive.
The report notoriously opens with a war analogy: “If an unfriendly foreign power
had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists
today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war” (The National Commission on
Excellence in Education 1983, 9). Though this is the only place that war is explicitly
mentioned in the document, the conflation of educational setbacks with danger is an
alarmist strategy that functions to unify the public behind essentialist educational policies
that prioritize basic skills and assessments and shift away from more progressive models
of education (Kaestle and Smith 1982, 392). Rather than addressing educational obstacles
from an objective, rational standpoint, state actors employ inflammatory language to
describe a threatening aggressor, or in this case, a hypothetical one, which creates public
fear. Similar to the civil defense strategy utilized in earlier years, fear is only useful to the
state if it can be constructively managed. In the 1950s and 1960s, public mayhem
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surrounding the possibility of nuclear holocaust was channeled into a pliable nuclear fear
by domesticating the bomb through civil defense programs. In the 1980s, fear was
intentionally manufactured in A Nation at Risk to more effectively manipulate the public
into supporting an agenda of federal educational reforms.
Following the overt weaponization of war terminology in the second paragraph,
the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) more vaguely alludes to
danger and solidifies a connection between educational reform and safety. The mention
of Sputnik on both pages nine and eleven references a time of greater American
educational achievement in the face of a threatening global competitor and is closely
followed by a description of the global climate. The NCEE argues for the creation of a
“Learning Society” dedicated to a set of values which encourage learning as a means for
professional and personal fulfillment. The creation of this society is situated within the
context of “a world of ever-accelerating competition and change in the conditions of the
workplace, of ever-greater danger, and of ever-larger opportunities for those prepared to
meet them” (National Committee on Excellence in Education 1983, 14). The global
context suggests that the NCEE is referring to competition with the Soviets and other
Cold War actors and is motivated by the economic recession of the time. Furthermore,
education is later framed as the cornerstone of industry and military, as the NCEE
describes the importance of education as the foundation for “a strong economy, and a
secure Nation” (National Committee on Excellence in Education 1983, 16). The NCEE
constructs a threatening problem and then prescribes the solution in the form of
educational reform, effectively utilizing war terminology to unify the public behind
federal intervention in education.
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The second theme the NCEE emphasizes is international comparison. The
committee outlines six key tasks of the report in the introduction, the second of which is
to compare American education with schooling in other “advanced nations” (National
Committee on Excellence in Education 1983, 7). The committee goes on to explain this
choice when highlighting the risk facing American schools, describing how the United
States is situated within a highly competitive and developed world. Americans use
products and ideas to compete within this global context for international ranking and
markets, but although our dominant position may have once been secure, “it is no longer”
(National Committee on Excellence in Education 1983, 10). The identification of this risk
is justified using statistical indicators that point to American education as a failing
institution, specifically when measured against other industrialized nations. The
committee describes declining student achievement, specifically reporting that “on 19
academic tests American students were never first or second and, in comparison with
other industrialized nations, were last seven times” (National Committee on Excellence in
Education 1983, 11). Their prioritization of international ranking functions to not only
instill fear of failure and inspire support for federal educational reforms, but these
comparisons encourage the American public to view other nations as competitors rather
than collaborators. This outlook on other nations shapes the American conception of
education, framing learning in terms of achievement and competition instead of growth
and fulfillment.
Another section of A Nation at Risk outlines the committee's findings regarding
expectations. The committee identifies ten deficiencies of American schools, noting
structural elements such as grading, diploma requirements, college selectivity,
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educational expenditures, and more. In terms of class requirements, the NCEE begins by
describing the situation in other industrialized nations, specifically reporting that “courses
in mathematics, biology, chemistry, physics, and geography start in grade 6 and are
required of all students,” which amounts to around three times the number of class hours
that American students dedicate to STEM subjects (National Committee on Excellence in
Education 1983, 18). Furthermore, the NCEE finds that “compared to other nations,
American students spend much less time on schoolwork,” solidifying the argument that
American youth are out-worked and out-performed (National Committee on Excellence
in Education 1983, 19). Therefore, these findings suggest that the government needs to
create schooling environments where students can work harder and perform better, which
once again, centers competition and achievement in the educational experience.
A notable aspect of the NCEE’s international comparisons is that the committee
never directly compares U.S. educational performance to that of Soviet Russia.
“Industrialized” and “advanced” nations are mentioned six times, but the qualifications
for earning these labels are never explained. Additionally, Japan, South Korea, and
Germany are all mentioned by name to reference the superior ability of other advanced
nations to make automobiles, steel mills, and machine tools (National Committee on
Excellence in Education 1983, 10). England is also directly referenced as an
industrialized country with longer school days and school years, demonstrating a
superiority in work ethic (National Committee on Excellence in Education 1983, 20).
Interestingly, the Cold War context made communist countries the most threatening
opposition to American achievement and dominance, but the only countries the NCEE
measured U.S. performance against were other capitalist countries. The NCEE even
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commissioned a research paper for A Nation at Risk—listed in Appendix C of the
document as “A Summary Report on the Educational Systems of the United States and
the Soviet Union: Comparative Analysis”—but never cited this paper directly to compare
the two educational systems. Instead, the committee subtly drew from the paper’s finding
that the Soviets possessed a much stronger orientation to the science and technology
fields by pushing for increased attention to STEM courses in the United States (Ailes &
Rushing 1980, 6). In this way, the Soviet-American comparison became a driving factor
in the educational reform without being named as a legitimate American competitor. By
assigning capitalist countries vague qualifiers that signify superiority, such as “advanced”
and “industrialized,” the NCEE conveys approval for these countries and therefore
legitimizes their economic and educational systems. In contrast, omitting communist
countries completely from this report—despite high educational performance—is a tactic
that delegitimizes their standings as globally competitive, “advanced” nations. Neglecting
to include communist countries, such as Russia and China, subtly adds to the American
sentiment that capitalism is associated with progress and development, while communism
fails to yield educational results.
A comparison of educational attitudes and statistics supports the hypothesis that
the omission of communist countries from A Nation at Risk is a delegitimizing tactic. To
the United States, comparison signals competition, but a lack of comparison does not
necessarily mean a lack of competition. For example, the NCEE praises other countries
for their strength in areas where American schooling appears to be weak, but stops short
of naming communist countries who excel in these areas. The report commends the
English education policy that students spend “8 hours a day at school, 220 days per year,”
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while describing how little American students attend school (National Committee on
Excellence in Education 1983, 20). However, when the NCEE describes America’s
declining expectations around college standards and selectivity, they fail to mention that
Soviet Russia is well-known for its ambitious attitude toward higher education. After
Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet policy began to focus on undergraduate enrollment, and
“the student body grew overall from 1 ½ million in 1953 to just over 5 million in 1978”
(Matthews 1983, 101). As a result, “the USSR claimed to be among the world’s leaders
in this respect” (Matthews 1983, 101). Additionally, the NCEE cites low literacy rates as
one of the main indications of risk, describing how “about 13 percent of all 17-year-olds
in the United States can be considered functionally illiterate,” and “functional illiteracy
among minority youth may run as high as 40 percent” (National Committee on
Excellence in Education 1983, 11). Comparatively, low literacy rates became a main
focus of the Soviet education project in the early 1920s, after an 1897 census had
reported that only about 21 percent of the population was literate (Timofeychev 2018). In
1920, former Premier of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, established the Extraordinary
Commission for the Liquidation of Illiteracy (Cheka Likbez), and by 1930, universal
primary education was introduced to the USSR, leading 40 million formerly illiterate
people to learn to read and write (Timofeychev 2018). Though Soviet Russia set a global
precedent for literacy programs, the NCEE chose to omit their successful education
initiative from A Nation at Risk, most likely to avoid glorifying Soviet systems and
policies. Here, a failure to name Soviet Russia as a competitor is a backhanded
assumption of superiority.
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The third theme the NCEE stresses is ideological justification. Throughout the
report, education is constructed as a key element of American ideology, and educational
failures are described as direct threats to the American ideology and way of life. For
example, the NCEE cites President Reagan early in the report: “Certainly there are few
areas of American life as important to our society, to our people, and to our families as
our schools and colleges” (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983, 9).
The inclusion of this quote solidifies education as a core aspect of American culture.
American values and ideology are then aligned with the purpose of education to depict
America as a righteous society working toward the greater good. The NCEE makes this
connection explicitly on the following page, writing, “a high level of shared education is
essential to a free, democratic society and to the fostering of a common culture,
especially in a country that prides itself on pluralism and individual freedom” (National
Commission on Excellence in Education 1983, 10). By making education a requirement
of liberal democracy, the broader concept of education is inextricably linked to liberal
ideology to legitimize American values in a universal sphere.
To further explain the centrality of education to the American values of pluralism
and individual freedom, the NCEE describes how the American public must have
common understandings on difficult and complicated issues, and ironically quotes
enslaver and founding father Thomas Jefferson: “I know no safe depository of the
ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is
not to take it from them but to inform their discretion” (National Commission on
Excellence in Education 1983, 10-11). The NCEE injects founding American principles
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and democratic ideology into their analysis to create a deep association between
American education and freedom. Freedom, however, is cleverly constructed as the
opportunity for all children “to attain the mature and informed judgment needed to secure
gainful employment, and to manage their own lives, thereby serving not only their own
interests but also the progress of society itself” (National Commission on Excellence in
Education 1983, 11). While freedom and employment are by no means equivalent, the
concepts are framed similarly to make labor seem more desirable as the ultimate outcome
of schooling. Labor is heavily emphasized in American education to help bolster the
economy, which in the early 1980s, was faltering due to the global economic recession.
Although there is no explicit connection to the Cold War through ideological rhetoric,
economic references interwoven into ideological justification only aided the United
States in their competition with other global superpowers.
The final theme, economic incentive, explores the connection between the
Americans’ ideological justification and attempts to improve the labor force. The first
major connection between education and the economy lies in the section titled “The
Public’s Commitment,” where the NCEE reviews survey data to highlight the importance
of education to the American people. Additionally, the committee outlines the high
demands of the American public in regard to graduation requirements, which set strict
expectations for the education system. They find hope for constructive reform in the
citizens’ knowledge that “education is one of the chief engines of a society’s material
well-being,” explaining that the government has a responsibility to nurture “the Nation’s
intellectual capital” (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983, 16). Here,
learning is commodified by assigning economic value to measurable outcomes. Good test
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scores are encouraged because they lead to good grades, and good grades are encouraged
because they supposedly lead to good employment, but none of these standards
necessarily lead to a good and happy life. The NCEE claims that education goes beyond
economic incentive and encompasses the “intellectual, moral, and spiritual strengths of
our people,” but this idea is not reflected in A Nation at Risk (National Commission on
Excellence in Education 1983, 10). Instead, the commission focuses its thirteen indicators
of risk on arbitrary educational standards and standardized testing data and does not
mention other indicators of risk that explore student morale. Therefore, education is
reduced to its economic value, and student welfare falls by the wayside.
Once again, the NCEE does not make a direct connection between education’s
economic incentive and the Cold War effort, but it does not need to in order to mobilize
the public behind education reform. Americans already felt the threat of impending
nuclear war with Soviet Russia, so the NCEE only needed to reference threats to safety,
international ranking, American ideology, and material well-being to ignite panic and
spark an education reform movement. Times of heightened international conflict clearly
require economic stability, but even more pressing is the desire for the United States to
exhibit ideological, military, educational, and economic dominance in the international
arena. The United States needs high student achievement on standardized tests and a
strong school-to-labor force pipeline in order to engage in global struggles like the Cold
War, which allow the state to police global ideology, exert military control over other
nations, and secure wealth.
A Nation at Risk serves as a warning to Americans that the failure to meet certain
educational standards makes the United States less internationally competitive and
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therefore, less capable of being a global superpower. In this sense, the report is a prime
example of how education is wielded as a weapon of war. We now know that the
education reforms that followed A Nation at Risk began an era of increased standardized
testing and federal intervention in schooling. We can reasonably infer that these policies
worked in favor of the state’s international agenda and did not offer American students an
adequate educational experience.
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Chapter 3: The Fundamental Directions of General Education and
Vocational School Reform
Shifting focus to the East, Soviet Russia approached educational reform more
bluntly. The Fundamental Directions of General and Vocational School Reform was a
1985 edict drafted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that kickstarted
the state’s final efforts to save the union through improved schooling. In the document,
the Soviets name their ideological and political intentions explicitly. The Soviets aimed
to mold citizens through what they viewed as a morally superior ideological framework.
Their vision of an idyllic Soviet society is woven throughout the document as the party
attempts to return to Vladimir Lenin’s conception of schooling as a method for shaping
the entire society; ideology, politics, labor, aesthetics, morals, and physicality are
portrayed as overlapping concepts that form the general personality development of
pupils. The development of individuals follows the Communist arc toward building a
utopian collective society. These ideas are communicated by repeatedly defining and
explaining the purpose behind Soviet education, conceptualizing education and ideology
as inseparable phenomena, and affirming the centrality of labor to schooling and the
society.
The CPSU first describes their intention for Soviet education reform as the
“raising of work done in the school to a new qualitative level which matches the
conditions and the requirements of developed socialist society” (Communist Party of the
Soviet Union 1985, 159). This broad statement regarding societal requirements is
followed by a specification of the three main areas for improvement: economic
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advancement through increased technical training, assimilation and unification through
stronger ideological curricula, and the affirmation of socialist values and principles
through high academic achievement. These ideas are echoed throughout the reform,
beginning with the Party’s illustration of Soviet society and development in 1985. The
CPSU describes the year as one of “profound transformations in all spheres of human
life—in material production, social relations, and spiritual [and intellectual] culture”
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 158). Education is framed as a way of
providing youth with “in-depth and sound knowledge of the scientific basics, to elicit the
habits and ability necessary to put that knowledge to practical use, and to shape a
materialistic world view (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 167). The Party
depicts Soviet society as forward-thinking and developed, demanding a system of
schooling that matches its peoples’ commitment to rigor and high ideals. Economic,
social, spiritual, and intellectual realms are explored as the necessary vehicles through
which society can fully realize socialist ideology in the form of Communism. Therefore,
the purpose of education lies in its usefulness for developing socialist ideology to
improve the material and spiritual lives of Soviet citizens.
Furthermore, the CPSU clarifies these goals by attaching to them tangible
measurements. For example, to bolster the Soviet economy, each citizen requires “an upto-the-minute education; a high degree of intellectual and physical development; in-depth
knowledge of the scientific, technological, and economic bases of production; and a
conscientious and creative attitude toward work” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union
1985, 161). These are not necessary objectives for pursuing spiritual and intellectual
growth, nor are they prerequisites to finding personal fulfillment through learning; the
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CPSU outlines these reform goals to describe the ideal Soviet citizen. Such a citizen
works in service of the state by concerning themself with political economics to
thoroughly understand state ideology. They demonstrate dedication to socialist ideals and
contribute to society through labor or creative innovation to demonstrate “socialism’s
historic advantage over capitalism” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 160).
The enumeration of these reform goals is explicit rhetorical evidence that highlights how
education was used as a weapon of the state.
While there are aspects of Fundamental Directions that indicate education’s use
as an instrument of war, there are also aspects that show an effort to improve the quality
of schooling for Soviet students. One of the reforms is to extend elementary school from
four years to five, attempting to “give the children a more thorough instruction in reading,
writing, number skills, and elementary work habits, and to reduce the pupil workload
while simultaneously facilitating the subsequent assimilation of basic knowledge”
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 164). Giving students more time to delve
deeply into class content indicates a move away from the total optimization of youth
labor. The CPSU also introduces the implementation of elective courses where students
in grades eight through eleven have the opportunity to “pursue the in-depth study of
individual subjects of their own choice, in the fields of physics and mathematics,
chemistry and biology, and social studies and the humanities,” allowing space for
students to explore their academic interests (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985,
165). Lastly, the Party outlines ways to improve conditions for native-language study in
Soviet states, showing a new intention to protect Indigenous cultures and promote
pluralism. While none of these initiatives explicitly aim to improve Soviet Russia’s
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economic standing or make the state more competitive with capitalist countries, they do
increase human capital and allow the Soviets to claim a moral high ground in comparison
to other states. Therefore, these reform initiatives do not overtly point to education as a
weapon of war, but subtly work to improve the Soviets’ international position. Providing
these opportunities for course flexibility, intellectual exploration, and native-language
study demonstrates an effort to nurture student development while also adding to the
state’s educational artillery by building human capital.
Overall, there are many places in the text that describe the intent behind Soviet
education. A common theme is intellectual improvement as a means of contributing more
effectively to the socialist state. Individual intellectual advancement is framed in terms of
the collective, demonstrating what can be achieved when personal accomplishments are
channeled for societal improvement. It is unclear whether the Soviets truly valued the
personal development of their students, or whether all attempts at holistic reforms had an
ulterior motive. Although they claimed complete faithfulness to socialist ideology and
Lenin’s vision, various factors contributed to divergence from this agenda. That is,
despite these details, Soviet Russia’s poor economy clearly drives many of Fundamental
Directions’ reform initiatives, pointing to the use of education as a means of survival and
international competition.
In addition to stating educational intentions, the CPSU is careful to conceptualize
education and ideology as inseparable phenomena. In the first line of the reform, the
CPSU describes their drive “toward the systematic and comprehensive optimization of
developed socialism,” and goes on to explain the teacher’s role as that “of carrying
forward the cause of the Great October [Revolution]” (Communist Party of the Soviet
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Union 1985, 158). The CPSU creates a parallel between the desires of the Party and the
teacher to establish the centrality of ideology to Soviet education and the entire society.
The Party goes on to outline Soviet educational achievements in the first section of the
document—titled “The school under the conditions generated by the optimization of
developed socialism”—and credits socialism with society’s advancement towards these
goals. Among the Soviet educational system’s accolades are “unprecedentedly extensive
opportunities to acquire knowledge, to assimilate all of the wealth of spiritual [and
intellectual] culture, and to manifest their [working people’s] talents and gifts”
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 159). The Soviets make societal and
educational advancement synonymous with socialism to legitimize their agenda as a
morally upright cause.
Education is further ideologized through the idolization of political actors in
Fundamental Directions. Vladimir Lenin’s ideas are referenced a total of ten times in the
document, usually to describe the driving motivations behind specific reform goals. The
CPSU names Lenin as “the source of the Soviet system of public education,” and assigns
the Soviet government the task of fulfilling his vision of a “unified, labor-based,
polytechnical school” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 159). The
conceptualization and depiction of Lenin as a political and cultural deity legitimizes his
vision of a fully realized communist state, which further legitimizes reform efforts that
claim to advance Soviet society towards its ultimate goal. Therefore, Lenin’s inclusion in
policy documents is used to garner widespread support from the Soviet people. This is
even more evident later in the document, when the CPSU describes new efforts to
enhance the upbringing of Soviet youth, citing Lenin’s assertion that “the entire
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undertaking of the upbringing, education, and studies of contemporary youth must
nurture in them a communist morality” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 171172). Though Lenin was long dead, his lasting presence in Soviet culture and politics
mirrors that of the American founding fathers and works to create inseparable ties
between ideology and education.
Another main avenue the CPSU uses to cement ideology in Soviet education is
the construction of a threatening aggressor. In an attempt to reinforce public support for
socialism, the CPSU warns of the threats facing a lackluster Soviet society. The Party
begins by openly acknowledging the Cold War context, warning that “as the international
situation grows increasingly grim, it becomes necessary to heighten our vigilance against
the stratagems of imperialism’s aggressive forces, for which anything goes when it comes
to assaulting socialism and which bank on the political inexperience of youth”
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 162). Their description of the problem
focuses on opposing ideologies and militaries, while their self-identified weakness is poor
political education. Therefore, the Party is able to create an ‘us versus them’ mentality to
unite Soviet citizens behind education reform that centers political ideology. The CPSU
goes on to prescribe a detailed solution, where humanities and social studies classes teach
“the routes of revolutionary global renewal, the fundamental principles and historical
advantages of socialism, and the reactionary, antipopular essence of capitalism”
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 170). Here, opposing ideologies are once
again mentioned by name to create a clear moral divide between Soviet society and
western societies, and to reinforce the protection of socialism using ideology centered
education reform.
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While the Soviets’ insist on implementing a dominant political ideology in the
classroom, their conception of ideological curricula limits the personality development
they claim to value. In the third section of the document, titled “Enhancing the quality of
the teaching and upbringing process,” the CPSU outlines reform initiatives that focus on
youth development. The Party argues for the importance of social studies and natural
science curricula that “elicit in pupils steadfast materialist perceptions, atheist views, and
the ability to explain natural and social phenomena correctly, in accordance with the
principles of our world view” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 170). The
idea that a person’s worldview—which is naturally subjective—can be incorrect because
it does not align with the state’s agenda is counterintuitive to the Party’s commitment to
personality development, as this approach limits youth agency and critical thinking skills.
Personality development is therefore defined and restricted by the state, and the binary of
right and wrong is projected onto youth through academic content. Therefore,
Fundamental Directions pressures teachers and students to comply with the Soviet
ideological agenda, serving the state’s efforts to create a unified socialist society and an
international socialist revolution.
Through these various methods—namely crediting socialism with societal
advancement, idolizing political figures, constructing a threatening aggressor, applying
educational theory, and forcing personality development that aligns with state ideology—
the Soviet state creates an educational system built around socialism. By making
education and ideology inseparable phenomena, the state creates a conveyor belt that
transforms youth into ideal Soviet citizens ready to defend and develop socialist society.
Although ideology might be the most important factor of Soviet education, the state also
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values the material advancement of its society, which allows for its survival and for
global competition with western countries. Therefore, labor becomes another pillar of
Soviet curricula and one of the central purposes of socialist schooling.
The Soviet economic climate is first referenced near the beginning of the
document, where the CPSU announces that “a transition to intensive economic
development is presently under way,” and “broadscale and inclusive socioeconomic
programs are being put into effect” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 158).
The CPSU mentions economic development early on to draw a clear connection between
the requirements for a successful socialist society and the work of the schoolteacher. The
Party goes on to explicitly state that schools are vehicles for societal change, writing, “the
imposing tasks that arise as this century draws to a close and a new one begins will be
tackled by those who are sitting in the schoolroom today” (Communist Party of the
Soviet Union 1985, 158). Though schooling is already widely accepted as a method for
improving the quality of life a state provides for its citizens, both economically and
otherwise, the Soviets are careful to reinforce the connection between proper schooling,
economic vitality, and protection of the Soviet lifestyle. By assigning schooling the task
of saving the Soviet economy, along with preserving other sectors of society, the CPSU
places a sense of urgency and importance on educational reform.
In Fundamental Directions, labor is mentioned 56 times and the economy is
mentioned 24 times, more than ideology, capitalism, communism, and socialism
combined. This is also more than triple the number of times these economic keywords
appear in A Nation at Risk. The frequency that these concepts are explored suggests that,
although Soviet schooling aims to develop the socialist state through ideological
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instruction, the protection of power through economic development reigns supreme. This
represents a key contradiction in the document, where Soviet legislators at once argue for
student-centered reforms while limiting student autonomy through the implementation of
labor requirements. The contradictory nature of the reform is merely a side effect of a
contradictory state, which aims to revolutionize society into a socialist utopia while still
attempting to compete in a global, capitalist system—creating a workforce crisis and
resulting in economically driven educational reform. Therefore, there appears to be a
desire within Fundamental Directions to bend the arc of schooling entirely by fully
submitting to economic demands. The CPSU aims to “strengthen the polytechnical bent
of educational content” by giving “more attention to practicums and laboratory exercises
and to demonstrations of how the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, and the other
sciences are applied in the technological context” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union
1985, 168). This represents a clear shift away from the Soviet literary emphasis of the
early 1900s, and therefore, a shift away from the prioritization of ideological curricula.
The CPSU affirms this transition, explaining that “socialist society has a visceral interest
in seeing the younger generation grow up to be physically well-developed, healthy, full
of vitality, and ready to work and defend the Motherland” (Communist Party of the
Soviet Union 1985, 173). The Party’s focus on the physical aspect of youth development
once again cements the connection they have drawn between labor and schooling,
creating a system of education that nurtures the physical capabilities of youth as opposed
to the mental.
Although some Soviet reform initiatives—such as the expansion of elementary
education and native language learning—demonstrate a desire to nurture student curiosity
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and well-being, the Soviets still allow the national economic situation to dictate the
parameters of schooling. The CPSU states, “the ratios among the streams available for
the further education of ninth grade graduates will be adjusted in accordance with the
requirements of the national economy,” with the goal of doubling student enrollment in
secondary vocational-technical training schools (Communist Party of the Soviet Union
1985, 164). This reform represents a blatant disregard for students’ academic interests
and limits the potential for intellectual fulfillment through schooling. Rather than center
students in their educational initiative, the Party demonstrates their loyalty to acquiring
and maintaining state power, which is only further affirmed by their stated intent of
replacing the universal general secondary education of young people with universal
general vocational education (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 165). Though
there is a stated desire to lower the minimum age restrictions for several occupations to
help meet these goals, the Party places the responsibility of this decision on “young
people, the parental community, and labor collectives,” showing restraint in at least one
area to protect the integrity of schooling (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985,
165). Despite the contradictory nature of many of their reforms, the CPSU remains
devoted to weaponizing schooling for the betterment of the economy, using schooling as
a tool to preserve the state and fight the Cold War.
Overall, the urgent need for economic restructuring is portrayed as one of the
driving forces behind the call for a “new and broader approach to the teaching and
upbringing of the rising generation” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 160).
The CPSU outlines the specific tasks at hand: bringing the national economy to the
forefront of scientific and technological innovation, automating the product sector,
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increasing overall labor productivity, and producing a globally competitive output.
Through the enumeration of these goals, the Party subtly places emphasis on improving
two specific areas of schooling—STEM courses and polytechnical training. While they
acknowledge the need for general education that prepares young people for learning at
higher educational institutions, they prioritize schooling that orients youth toward
“socially useful labor in the national economy,” regarding technical labor upbringing as a
“crucial agent of personality formation and as a means of satisfying the national
economy’s manpower requirements” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 161).
Here, labor is explicitly conceptualized as a central focus of not only Soviet education,
but of youth character. The large emphasis placed on labor in both the personal and
academic spheres demonstrates the Soviets’ desperation for a larger workforce.
Therefore, education is utilized for the survival of the state, shifting attention away from
intellectual fulfillment towards the economic usefulness of education.
Though not well known by name, Fundamental Directions represented a shift
towards Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring), changing the organization of Soviet
schooling and assigning to it a clear economic intent. In this way, the reform was an
effort to reconceptualize education to meet the demands of a struggling state. When
placed in context, the Soviet Union was tackling large tasks through their 1980s reform
initiatives—namely, surviving through an economic recession and reaffirming their entire
political ideology and system under the threat of war with the West. Because schooling is
an effective way to instill political values in youth and shape their future participation in
the workforce, education was weaponized to achieve the Soviet state’s political goals,
making it an effective instrument of war. However, despite the CPSU’s best efforts, we
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now know that the Soviet education system would fail to achieve this great feat in time,
and their state would dissolve within a decade.
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Chapter 4: Comparing Weaponization
There are major similarities in the methods and intentions behind educational
weaponization in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Both A Nation at Risk and Fundamental
Directions propose education reforms that center labor productivity, submission to state
ideology, and international competition. While the United States held an advantageous
economic position at the time, both states were struggling to reinvigorate their economies
and assert their respective ideologies. The Soviets and Americans both utilized education
as an instrument of state control, aiming to mitigate international threats and strengthen
domestic resources by training the youth population to serve the state. This suggests that,
despite their opposing ideologies, the Cold War context and desire to remain globally
competitive took priority over ideological application in the classroom. I previously
posed the questions: Did the U.S. and Soviet Russia weaponize their education systems
during the final phase of the Cold War? If so, how did this weaponization manifest? In
this chapter, I review my hypotheses and weigh them against the outcomes of my
analysis, discovering new insights that prompt future research around applications of
education theory.
While both states weaponized education to gain an upper hand—the Soviets
primarily through ideology and the Americans primarily through economics—there was a
striking transformation from the earlier threats to citizens’ physical safety to a more
contemporary threat to the safety of their values and lifestyles. Neither document
mentioned civil defense programs, despite their earlier dominance in the educational
rhetoric of the 1950s, as it was more widely acknowledged in the 1980s that duck-andSahm 39

cover drills would not protect Americans or Soviets from nuclear holocaust. Instead,
there was an increased focus in both documents on threats to the two states’ respective
lifestyles and cultures. In A Nation at Risk, the NCEE argues that Americans need to
understand how “individuals in our society who do not possess the levels of skill,
literacy, and training essential to this new era will be effectively disenfranchised, not
simply from the material rewards that accompany competent performance, but also from
the chance to participate fully in our national life” (National Commission on Excellence
in Education 1983, 10). Here, the loss of not only material well-being, but also of culture
and community, is described as the major consequence of failing to implement education
reform. Similarly, Fundamental Directions contains warnings of the fall of the socialist
state if appropriate education reforms are not enacted. The CPSU argues that “the growth
of ideological commitment, learning, and occupational proficiency among new
generations of Soviet people” are necessary for “the deeper entrenchment of socialist
democracy,” without which, the Soviet way of life would fall to aggressive imperialist
forces (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 161-162). Once again, the state
constructs a threat to its citizens’ way of life, striking fear in the public and making them
more reliant on the state to deliver solutions to the problems at hand. This scare tactic is
effective in gathering support for federal and centralized state intervention in local
schools: A Nation at Risk successfully led to the passage of education reforms that
centered standardized testing and quantitative standards for intellectual growth, while
Fundamental Directions was successfully implemented and restructured the relationship
between the school and the workforce.

Sahm 40

Despite the centrality of economics to both A Nation at Risk and Fundamental
Directions, the Soviets and Americans diverged in their approaches to the topic. The
Soviets placed a particularly large emphasis on economic development in response to the
impact of the global recession. An example of this is their call for “pupil production
brigades” and “inter-school production training centers,” which channel youth labor for
economic gain, further solidifying a connection between schooling and productivity
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 176). On the surface, this approach has
capitalist underpinnings despite the Soviet’s stated commitment to Leninist ideals.
However, the lack of international focus in the Soviets’ economic reforms distinguishes
their approach from A Nation at Risk.
Soviet attempts at economic renewal were nationally focused with the goal of
meeting national labor requirements; in contrast, American efforts were globally focused
with the goal of dominating international markets. Though the NCEE avoids explicit
statements of economic intent in A Nation at Risk, they instead frame economic
production in terms of global competitiveness. Specifically, the NCEE mentions a
“steady 25-year decline in industrial productivity,” but quickly conceptualizes this
economic loss in terms of international standings, asserting that “one great American
industry after another falls to world competition” (National Committee on Excellence in
Education 1983, 17). The suggestion that American industry and productivity is paling in
comparison to other industrialized nations elicits fear in American workers, which allows
the U.S. government to implement economic-centered education reform with less
pushback. The difference in intent behind the two states’ economic rhetoric—with one
focusing on international competition and the other focusing on national labor
Sahm 41

requirements—indicates a presence of educational weaponization in the American case
study and an absence of educational weaponization in the Soviet case study.
The Soviets’ utilization of education for state control transforms into a weapon of
state dominance when we consider the ideological factor. In Fundamental Directions,
international comparison surfaced most frequently when considering the threats facing
the socialist state. The CPSU mentions overcoming imperialist and capitalist forces
several times, showing the state’s explicit desire to assert ideological supremacy in a
global sphere. Specifically, the party argues that social science pedagogy should clearly
outline how “the concepts of communism will inevitably triumph” (Communist Party of
the Soviet Union 1985, 170). This declaration points to not only the Cold War context,
but to the Soviet desire to compete ideologically. Because Soviet education reform is
built around this notion, Fundamental Directions clearly demonstrates educational
weaponization for global ideological dominance.
While the CPSU is explicit with their competitive ideological intentions, the
NCEE portrays American ideology as less of a competitive factor—conceptualizing
ideology as merely a set of national ideals to aspire to. It is important to note this
distinction between the two countries’ ideological approaches; however, it is also
important to acknowledge the global context that most likely caused this distinction.
While the United States possessed an already globally dominant political ideology, the
Soviets were still attempting to assert their ideology as a legitimate and respectable
model at the international level. For this reason, capitalist nations benefited from the
ability to attack the Soviets while rhetorically delegitimizing their political ideology,
while the Soviets needed to consistently prove the efficacy of their ideology and state
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through a more aggressive rhetorical comparison. Despite this context, the Soviets’
rhetorical approach to comparative ideology demonstrates a weaponization of education
in their attempt to win the Cold War.

Conclusion
In an almost paternalistic sense, states promise their citizens protection so long as
they fall in line with state policies. Therefore, Soviet and American schools are
transformed by policies that reduce education to the acquisition of basic knowledge, and
the two states benefit from this schooling conveyor belt because it bolsters the national
labor force and creates a docile citizenry who are socialized into the national culture and
ideology. Through this system, schools become a place of social reproduction, shifting
away from holistic practices that humanize and give agency to student populations. While
educational weaponization manifested differently in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., the centrality
of international competition to both reform documents illustrates a striking similarity.
The U.S. approached education as a tool for building a competitive national economy,
while Soviet Russia approached education as a tool for building a united citizenry in
support of globalized communism. This thesis started as hypothesis-testing around
educational weaponization, however, my analysis also speaks to scholarship on
educational theory. Both A Nation at Risk and Fundamental Directions fail to engage
purposely with theories of pedagogy and learning. However, through this lack of
theoretical intentionality, the two states subconsciously engage with a globally dominant,
Western approach to education—essentialism.

Sahm 43

My comparison and analysis of U.S. and Soviet weaponization of education
suggests that one possible explanation for a renewed essentialist movement in the 1980s
lies in the purpose of the essentialist educational model, described in Ornstein’s
Foundations of Education as an effort “to educate the useful and competent person,” as
well as “transmit the cultural heritage and contribute to socioeconomic efficiency”
(Ornstein 2006, 113). With emphases on the usefulness and competence of students, as
well as their entrenchment in national culture and contributions to the national economy,
essentialist theory clearly follows a competitive and productive model conducive to
winning a war. Other models of education—namely those that align with the visions of
progressivists and critical theorists such as John Dewey and Paulo Freire1—take on the
more difficult task of nurturing student well-being and instilling in youth the critical
thinking and problem-solving abilities needed to tackle social issues.
In the midst of national crises, the U.S. and Soviet Russia both aimed to instill
fear in their citizens to garner support for essentialist reforms, which afford more
governmental control over schooling. For example, the NCEE describes the United
States’ decline in academic performance as akin to an act of war, using alarmist language
to motivate popular support for A Nation at Risk. At the same time, the CPSU explicitly
mentions capitalism and fascism as active threats to Soviet society, proposing
Fundamental Directions as the primary way to protect Soviet ideals. As we saw with

John Dewey published his first major work in 1938, a pamphlet titled “The School and Society,”
where he argued that schools should reflect the societies they exist within, and students should
learn experientially. Essentialist educational philosophy was officially created the very same year,
when William C. Bagley published “An Essentialist’s Platform for the Advancement of American
Education.” Paulo Freire didn’t come until later, publishing his best-known work, “Pedagogy of the
Oppressed,” in 1968.
1
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earlier efforts to implement civil defense programs, the construction of aggressive threats
is an effective method for garnering support for more intrusive policies. Voters
repeatedly support federal intervention and more centralized government in the face of
danger—such as with the passage of the National Defense Education Act after two world
wars and the launch of Sputnik, or the implementation of No Child Left Behind in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Looking to the final era of the Cold War, we can
infer that the global economic recession, among other state-specific factors such as Soviet
leadership instability and low American educational performance, provided the crisis
needed to spark a centralized essentialist educational campaign.
Despite the dominance of their essentialist reform agenda, Soviet Russia slightly
differed from the United States in its engagement with educational theory. Noticeably
missing from A Nation at Risk is a clear theoretical intent that explains how the reform
proposal would create desired student outcomes. Essentialism is accepted without critical
thought around how this theory shapes the schooling ecosystem. In contrast, Soviet
Russia reverts to essentialism in their time of crisis, but not without first engaging with
educational theory. Though the content of their reforms does not align with their stated
theoretical intent, their awareness of divergent educational models signals a step in the
right direction for global legislators. Specifically, the CPSU argues to “extirpate
resolutely any manifestations of formalism in the content and methods of teaching and
upbringing work and in school life and in the ways of evaluating pupil knowledge”
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985, 162). In educational theory, formalisms are
school or societal norms that are considered to be objective but were formed with specific
intentions or biases. Though educational formalisms are not necessarily negative,
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“pernicious formalisms are ones that have been, often unconsciously introduced as
schooling customs from a particular social class or cultural group and that cannot be
reasonably expected to be the same for every child” (Rozycki 2005, 163). While preestablished customs might be simple and efficient to engage with in schools, these
formalisms are left untouched and unchecked without critical community engagement.
Though the CPSU appears to be more conscious of the way negative social biases
infiltrate institutional structures, their condemnation of formalism is never followed up
with concrete policy implementations that would help this declaration materialize.
Therefore, the CPSU claims loyalty to one theory while enacting another.
The Soviet-American educational comparison suggests the need for a turning
point in the way we conceptualize political ideology and the way we understand
educational legislation. Though state-supported political ideology is widely believed to
shape the structure of a given society, there is a lack of awareness surrounding the impact
of international competition on a state’s engagement with ideology. Soviet Russia
implemented similar essentialist-centered reforms that were proposed in A Nation at Risk
despite the two states’ opposing values, which comments on the larger phenomenon that
global competition funnels states into competitive educational models regardless of
political ideology. In other words, the global domination of capitalism eliminates the
ability for socialist states to truly be socialist—these states must compete in a capitalist
world in order to survive, which effectively detracts from the implementation of their
political ideology in schools and beyond. Despite their varying approaches to economic
and ideological factors, the U.S. and Soviet Russia still wielded their education systems
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as weapons of war, demonstrating the desirability of international dominance that is
privileged over loyalty to ideology.
Looking forward, it is paramount that communities more thoroughly engage with
their states’ policymaking, demanding clarity around the process of applying desired
ideologies in schools. The Soviet-American comparison demonstrates how ideology is
lost in policy-making due to international competition, divorcing legislation from the
peoples’ political values and expectations. In order to envision a justice-oriented and
student-centered approach to education, we must promote theoretical fluency in our
communities. Building this knowledge and practice would improve our networks of
accountability for those in power and center community needs in the curriculum. With a
more developed awareness of educational theory, communities might more effectively
engage in what Espinoza—an educational scholar focused on pedagogies of dignity—
describes as “radical critique and social dreaming,” shifting schooling toward a more
liberatory and community-centered model (Espinoza 2008). We have seen this critical
and theoretical engagement with schooling in other historical periods, such as when the
Black Panther Party initiated a movement for community-controlled education that
challenged the white supremacist status quo in the 1960s and 1970s (Williamson 2005).
Global educational history demonstrates how collective community responses to crises
such as racism and war have successfully educated children in a liberatory tradition.
Without a disruption to the continuous, politically constructed cycle of fear and increased
state control, the biggest risk to our students will be the policies implemented to educate
and protect them when crisis strikes.
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